Humans and nonhuman great apes share a sense for intuitive statistical reasoning, making intuitive probability judgments based on proportional information. This ability is of fundamental importance, in particular for inferring general regularities from finite numbers of observations and, vice versa, for predicting the outcome of single events using prior information. To date it remains unclear which cognitive mechanism underlies and enables this capacity. The aim of the present study was to gain deeper insights into the cognitive structure of intuitive statistics by probing its signatures in chimpanzees and humans. We tested 24 sanctuary-living chimpanzees in a previously established paradigm which required them to reason from populations of food items with different ratios of preferred (peanuts) and non-preferred items (carrot pieces) to randomly drawn samples. In a series of eight test conditions, the ratio between the two ratios to be discriminated (ROR) was systematically varied ranging from 1 (same proportions in both populations) to 16 (high magnitude of difference between populations). One hundred and forty-four human adults were tested in a computerized version of the same task. The main result was that both chimpanzee and human performance varied as a function of the log(ROR) and thus followed Weber's law. This suggests that intuitive statistical reasoning relies on the same cognitive mechanism that is used for comparing absolute quantities, namely the analogue magnitude system.
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Introduction
Statistical reasoning is of fundamental importance in human life and one of the hallmarks of human thinking: we continually generalize from sample observations and use these generalizations to predict the outcome of events and to make rational decisions under uncertainty. Nevertheless, over many decades statistical reasoning was deemed to be dependent on language and mathematical training and to remain difficult and error-prone throughout an individual's lifespan (e.g. Piaget & Inhelder, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 , 1981 . More recently, however, developmental research produced evidence that even preverbal infants are capable of basic forms of intuitive statistics: For example, when confronted with two jars containing mixtures of attractive and neutral candy in different proportions, infants were able to infer which of the two was more likely to lead to a preferred candy as randomly drawn sample (Denison & Xu, 2010a , 2014 . This also works in the other direction: When confronted with samples, infants could draw conclusions about the proportional composition of the associated populations (Denison, Reed, & Xu, 2013; Xu & Garcia, 2008) . Even more impressively, such statistical information is integrated with knowledge from other cognitive domains from very early on: Infants seem to understand that a sample does not necessarily reflect the population's distribution, for instance when the experimenter has the intention to draw a certain type of object as well as visual access to the population (Xu & Denison, 2009 ), or when a mechanical constraint prevents her from drawing some of the objects (Denison, Trikutam, & Xu, 2014; Denison & Xu, 2010b) . Similarly, infants can integrate complex spatio-temporal information into their statistical inferences to judge single event probabilities: When a population of objects bounced randomly in a container with one opening, infants formed expectations as to which object was most likely to exit, based on the proportional composition of the population (majority objects are more likely to exit) and each objects' spatial distance from the opening (the closer objects are, the more likely they are to exit; Teglas et al., 2011) .
These findings demonstrated that neither language nor mathematical education are prerequisites for basic statistical reasoning. 
